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I Introduction
This paper provides an optimal nonlinear income tax formula that solves the redistribution
problem when individuals respond along both the intensive (in-work e¤ort) and extensive (par-
ticipation) margins. For that purpose, we consider an economy where individuals are hetero-
geneously endowed with two unobserved characteristics: their skill level and their disutility of
participation. Because of the rst heterogeneity, employed workers typically choose di¤erent
earnings levels. Because of the second heterogeneity, at any skill level, only some individuals
choose to work. The government can only condition taxation on endogenous earnings and not
on the exogenous characteristics whose heterogeneity in the population are at the origin of the
redistribution problem.1 Therefore, positive marginal tax rates are necessary to transfer income
from rich to poor individuals, while inherently distorting intensive labor supply decisions. More-
over, when individuals of a given skill level experience a rise either in the tax level they paid
when employed or in the benet for the nonemployed, some of them leave the labor force. This
rise of the so-called participation tax2 thereby generate distortions along the extensive margin
of the labor supply.
Since Mirrlees (1971), the optimal tax problem is usually solved by searching for the best
incentive-compatible allocation and applying variational calculus condition to these allocations.
While this method has been proved successful, it lacks economic intuitions. We instead derive the
optimal tax formula by measuring the e¤ects of a change in marginal tax rates on a small interval
of income levels.3 This tax perturbation approach emphasizes the economic mechanisms at
work but faces the following di¢ culty: because of the nonlinearity of the tax schedule, when an
individual responds to a tax perturbation by a change in her labor supply, the induced change of
her gross income a¤ects in turn the marginal tax rate she faces, thereby inducing a further labor
supply response. To take this circular process into account, we dene behavioral elasticities
along the optimal nonlinear tax schedule. Thanks to this redenition, we can intuitively express
optimal marginal rates as a function of the social welfare weights, the skill distribution and the
behavioral elasticities. This formula generalizes previous results by allowing for income e¤ects
and extensive margin responses.
We also provide a su¢ cient condition under which optimal marginal tax rates are nonneg-
ative. Clarifying the restrictions that ensure this result is an issue in the optimal income tax
1Because the second heterogeneity matters only for the participation decisions, the government faces a multi-
dimensional screening problem that is reduced to the random participationmodel introduced by Rochet and
Stole (2002).
2Which equals the tax level plus the benet for the non-employed, so that each additional worker increases
the governmentsrevenue by the level of the participation tax.
3We verify in Appendix that the solution derived thanks to the tax perturbation approach is consistent with
the Mirrleesian approach in terms of incentive-compatible allocations.
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literature with only intensive responses.4 Intuitively, the optimality of nonnegative marginal
tax rates holds whenever social welfare weights are decreasing along the skill distribution, so
the distortion induced by positive marginal tax rates are compensated by the equity gain of
transferring income from high to low-skilled workers. Adding an extensive margin response,
we nd a condition on the ratio one minus the social welfare weights over the extensive be-
havioral response. Strikingly, the optimal participation tax equals this ratio when individuals
respond only along the extensive margin. When both margins are included, we show show that
optimal marginal tax rates are nonnegative whenever this ratio decreases along the skill distri-
bution. While our su¢ cient condition is expressed in terms of endogenous variables, we discuss
its relevance in practice and give examples of specications on primitives where this condition
holds. For instance, when the government has a Maximin objective, we argue that the additional
restrictions are fairly weak.
Using U.S. data, we also calibrate the model to illustrate the quantitative implications of our
optimal tax formula. These simulations suggest that the introduction of an extensive margin
reduces marginal tax rates by a signicant amount, while the tax schedule remains qualitatively
similar. In our sensitivity analysis, marginal tax rates are always positive. However, for the least
skilled workers, participation taxes are typically negative under a Benthamite criterion, while
they are always positive under Maximin. The literature on optimal taxation in the pure extensive
model has typically found these results and interprets optimality of negative participation tax
at the bottom of the skill distribution as a case for an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
form of income-tax transfer instead of a Negative Income Tax (NIT) form (see Saez 2002). We
provide examples with a strictly positive lower bound for the earnings distribution,5 a negative
participation tax at this minimum (as for the EITC) and nonnegative marginal tax rates above
this minimum (as for the NIT).
Our paper contributes to the literature that aims at making the literature on optimal income
taxation useful for applied thinking in public nance. For many years after the seminal paper of
Mirrlees (1971), the numerous developments of the theory focused on useful technical renements
but provided little economic intuitions. A rst important progress was made when, in the
absence of income e¤ects, Atkinson (1990), Piketty (1997) and Diamond (1998) re-expressed
optimality conditions derived from the Mirrlees model in terms of behavioral elasticities. Saez
(2001) made a second important step forward by deriving an optimal tax formula thanks to a
tax perturbation approach.6 He takes into account the abovementioned circular process by
4See e.g. Mirrlees (1971), Sadka (1976), Seade (1982), Werning (2000) or Hellwig (2007), or the counterexam-
ples given by Choné and Laroque (2009b).
5We assume a strictly positive minimum for the skill distribution.
6Christiansen (1981) introduces the tax perturbation approach. However, he did not derive any implication for
the optimal income tax, his focus being on the optimal provision of public goods and the structure of commodity
taxation. Revecz (1989) proposes a method to derive an optimal income tax formula in terms of elasticities but
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expressing his optimal tax formula in terms of the unappealing notion of virtual7 earnings
distribution and veries the consistency of his solution to the Mirrlees one. He furthermore
allows for income e¤ects. We avoid the use of virtual densities thanks to our redenition of
behavioral elasticities.
The aforementioned papers neglect labor supply responses along the extensive margin, while
the empirical labor supply literature emphasizes that labor supply responses along the extensive
margin are much more important (see e.g. Heckman 1993). Saez (2002) derives an optimal
tax formula in an economy with both intensive and extensive margins. For that purpose, he
develops a model where agents can choose among a nite set of occupations, each of them being
associated to an exogenous level of earnings. However, he has no analytical result for the mixed
case where both the extensive and intensive margins matter. Moreover, he focuses essentially
on the EITC/NIT debate about whether working poor should receive more transfers than non-
employed individuals, while we discuss the conditions under which marginal tax rates should be
nonnegative. In addition, our formula allows for income e¤ects.8 Finally, our treatment of the
intensive margin is more standard and it allows considering a continuous earnings distribution.
This seems to us more appropriate for studying marginal tax rates than the discrete occupation
setting of Saez (2002).9
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section II. Section III derives
the optimal tax formula in terms of behavioral elasticities thanks to a tax perturbation method.
This section also compares this tax formula to the literature. Section IV provides a condition
su¢ cient to get optimal nonnegative marginal tax rates and examples where this condition
is satised. Section V presents simulations for the U.S. In appendix, we develop the formal
model. In particular, we solve it for the optimal allocations thanks to the usual optimal control
approach. We verify that this solution is consistent with the one we derive in the main text.
does not consider the abovementioned circular process. Hence his solution is not consistent with the Mirrlees one
(see Revecz 2003 and Saez 2003). Using a tax perturbation method, Piketty (1997) derives the optimal nonlinear
income tax schedule under Maximin. He too neglects to take into account the circular process but this has no
consequence since he assumes away income e¤ects. Roberts (2000) derives it also under Benthamite preferences.
7Saez (2001, p.215) denes the virtual density at earnings level z as the density of incomes that would take
place at z if the tax schedule T (:) were replaced by the linear tax schedule tangent to T (:) at level z.
8The formal model in the Appendix of Saez (2002) allows for the possibility of income e¤ects. Moreover, the
appendix of the NBER version of Saez (2002) extends his optimal tax formula with both extensive and intensive
responses to the case of a continuum of earnings but without income e¤ects.
9Boone and Bovenberg (2004) introduce search decisions in the Mirrlees model. This additional margin has a
similar avor as a participation decision. However, their specication of the search technology implies that any
individual with a skill level above (below) an endogenous threshold searches at the maximum intensity (does not
search).
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II The model
II.1 Individuals
Each individual derives utility from consumption C and disutility from labor supply or e¤ort
L. More e¤ort implies higher earnings Y , the relationship between the two depending also
on the individuals skill endowment w. The literature typically assumes that Y = w  L.
To avoid this unnecessary restriction on the technology, we express individualspreference in
terms of the observables (C and Y ) and the individualsexogenous characteristics (including
w). This in addition enables us to consider cases where the preferences over consumption C and
e¤ort L are skill-dependent. Skill endowments are exogenous, heterogeneous and unobserved
by the government. Hence, consumption C is related to earnings Y through the tax function
C = Y   T (Y ).
The empirical literature has emphasized that a signicant part of labor supply responses to
tax reforms are concentrated along the extensive margin. We integrate this feature by considering
a specic disutility of participation which makes a di¤erence in the level of utility only between
workers (for whom Y > 0) and nonemployed (for whom Y = 0). This disutility may be due
to commuting, searching for a job, or a reduced amount of time available for home production.
However, for some people, employment has a value per se. Some of them would feel stigmatized
if they had no job. Let  denote an individuals disutility of participation net of this stigma, if
any. We assume that people are endowed with di¤erent (net) disutility of participation . As
for the skill endowment,  is exogenous and the government cannot observe it. Because of this
additional heterogeneity, individuals with the same skill level may take di¤erent participation
decisions. This is consistent with the observation that in all OECD countries, skill-specic
employment rates always lie inside (0; 1).
For tractability, we need that labor supply decisions Y among employed workers depend
only on their skill and not on their net disutility of participation. To get this simplication, we
need to impose some separability in individualspreferences. We specify the utility function of
an individual of type (w;) as:
U (C; Y;w)  IY >0   (1)
where IY >0 is an indicator variable equal to one if the individual works and zero otherwise. The
gross utility function U (:; :; :) is twice-continuously di¤erentiable and is concave with respect
to (C; Y ). Individuals derive utility from consumption C and disutility from labor supply, so
U 0C > 0 > U 0Y . Last, we impose the strict-single crossing (Spence-Mirrlees) condition. We assume
that, starting from any positive level of consumption and earnings, more skilled workers need to
be compensated by a smaller increase in their consumption to accept a unit rise in their earnings.
This implies that the marginal rate of substitution  U 0Y (C; Y;w) =U 0C (C; Y;w) decreases in the
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skill level. Hence we have:
U 00Y w (C; Y;w)  U 0C (C; Y;w)  U 00Cw (C; Y;w)  U 0Y (C; Y;w) > 0 (2)
The distribution of skills is described by the density f (:), which is continuous and positive
over the support [w0; w1], with 0 < w0 < w1  +1. The lowest skill being nonzero, we leave
aside the issue of redistribution where some people have a severe handicap. The size of the total
population is normalized to 1 so
R w1
w0
f (w) dw = 1. The distribution of  conditional on skill
level w is described by the conditional density k (:; w) and the cumulative distribution K (:; w),
with k (;w)
def @K (;w) =@. The density is continuously di¤erentiable. It is worth noting
that w and  may be distributed independently or may be correlated. The support of the
distribution is ( 1; max], with max  +1. The assumption about the lower bound is made
for tractability since it ensures a positive mass of employed workers at each skill level.
Each agent solves the following maximization problem
max
Y
U (Y   T (Y ) ; Y; w)  IY >0  
where the choice of Y can be decomposed into a participation decision (i.e. Y = 0 or Y > 0)
and an intensive choice when Y > 0 (i.e. the value of Y ). For a worker of type (w;), choosing
a positive earnings level Y to maximize U (C; Y;w) subject to C = Y   T (Y ) amounts to solve
Uw
def max
Y
U (Y   T (Y ) ; Y; w) (3)
In particular, two workers of the same skill levels but with di¤erent disutilities of participation
 face the same intensive choice program, thereby taking the same decisions along the intensive
margin.10 Let Yw be the intensive choice of a worker of skill w and let Cw be the corresponding
consumption level, so Cw = Yw   T (Yw). The gross utility of workers of skill w therefore equals
Uw = U (Cw; Yw; w). We ignore the nonnegativity constraint on Yw when solving the intensive
choice program. We verify in our simulations that the minimum of the earnings distribution is
always positive (since we assume w0 > 0). So, we are right to neglect the possibility of bunching
due to the nonnegativity constraint.
10The key assumption for this result is that preferences over consumption and earnings for employed agents
vary only with skills and do not depend on the net disutility of participation . Such property is obtained under
weakly separable preferences of the form
W (C; Y;w; ) =

V (U (C; Y;w) ; w; )
U0 (C;w; ) if
Y > 0
Y = 0
where W is discontinuous at Y = 0. V (:; :; :) is an aggregator that is increasing in its rst argument. Function
U (:; :; :) veries U 0C > 0 > U 0Y and (2). U0 (:; :; :) describes the preference of the nonemployed and increases in its
rst argument. Functions U (:; :; :), U0 (:; :; :) and V (:; :; :) are twice-continuously di¤erentiable over respectively
R+ R+  [w0; w1], R+  [w0; w1]R+ and R [w0; w1]R+. Finally, we assume that for given levels of C, Y ,
w and b, the function  7! V (U (C; Y;w) ; w; )   U0 (b; w; ) is decreasing and tends to +1 whenever  tends
to the lowest bound of its support. All results derived in this paper can be obtained under this more general
specication, the additional di¢ culty being only notational
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We now turn to the participation decisions. Let b =  T (0) denote the consumption level for
individuals out of the labor force. We call b the welfare benet. If an individual of type (w;)
chooses to work, she gets utility Uw . If she chooses not to participate she obtains U (b; 0; w).
An individual of type (w;) chooses to work if Uw     U (b; 0; w) ,   Uw   U (b; 0; w).
Therefore, the density of workers of skill w is given by h (w) dened as:
h (w)
def K (Uw   U (b; 0; w) ; w)  f (w) (4)
with some abuse of notation since h (w) does not make explicit the dependence of h (:) with
respect to b and to Uw. The function h (w) is twice-continuously di¤erentiable, increasing in Uw
and decreasing in b, with respective derivatives h0U (w) and h
0
b (w). The cumulative distribution
is H (w) =
R w
w0
h (n)  dn. There are H (w1) employed workers and 1 H (w1) nonemployed.
II.2 Behavioral elasticities
We dene the behavioral elasticities from the intensive choice program (3) and the extensive
margin decision (4). When the tax function is di¤erentiable, the rst-order condition associated
to the intensive choice (3) implies:
1  T 0 (Yw) =  U
0
Y
U 0C
(5)
where the derivatives of U (:) are evaluated at (Cw; Yw; w). When, in addition, the tax function
is twice di¤erentiable, the second-order condition writes:11
U 00Y Y   2
U 0Y
U 0C

U 00CY +
U 0Y
U 0C
2
U 00CC   T 00 (Yw)  U 0C  0 (6)
Whenever the second-order condition (6) holds strictly, which we henceforth assume through
the rest of this section, the rst-order condition (5) denes implicitly12 earnings Yw as a function
of skill level and of the tax function. The elasticity w of earnings with respect to the skill level
equals:13
w
def w
Yw
 _Yw =  
w
Yw
 [U 00Y w  U 0C   U 00Cw  U 0Y ]
U 00Y Y   2
U 0Y
U 0c

U 00CY +
U 0Y
U 0c
2 U 00CC   T 00 (Yw)  U 0C  U 0C (7)
11By the concavity of U (:; :; :) on (C; Y ), the second-order condition is satised if the tax schedule is locally
linear or convex (so that T 00 (:)  0), or is not too concave.
12 In addition, one has to assume that among the possible multiple local maxima of Y 7! U (Y   T (Y ) ; Y; w),
a single one corresponds to the global maximum. If program Y 7! U (Y   T (Y ) ; Y; w) admits two global
maxima for a skill level w, workers of a skill level w slightly above (below) w would strictly prefer the higher
(lower) maximum due to the strict single-crossing condition (see Equation (2)). Hence, function w 7! Yw exhibits
a discontinuity at skill w. Moreover, again by the the strict single-crossing condition, function w 7! Yw is
nondecreasing. So, it is discontinuous on a set of skill levels that is at worst countable (and at best empty), which
is of zero measure.
13See Appendix A.
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Figure 1: Tax reforms around Yw dening behavioral responses "w and w.
Let h^ (Y ) and H^ (Y ) denote respectively the density and cumulative of the earnings distrib-
ution among employed workers, with @H^ (Y ) =@Y = h^ (Y ). Therefore, one has for all skill levels
that H^ (Yw)  H (w). From Equation (7), h (w) and bh (Yw) are related by:
Yw
w
 w  h^ (Yw)  h (w) (8)
If the left-hand side of (6) is nil, then the function Y 7! U (Y   T (Y ) ; Y; w) becomes typically
constant around w. Therefore, individuals of type w are indi¤erent between a range of earnings
level, so the function n 7! Yn becomes discontinuous at skill n = w. The same phenomenon also
occurs when the tax function is downward discontinuous at Yw (T 00 (Y ) tends to minus innity,
so (6) is violated). Conversely, bunching of types occurs when w = 0 (i.e. T 00 (Y ) tends to
plus innity). This corresponds to a kink of the tax function. From now, we assume T (:) is
di¤erentiable. Hence we rule out bunching. However, this assumption is relaxed in appendix
where we solve the model in terms of incentive-compatible allocations and study what happens
when bunching occurs.
We now consider di¤erent elementary tax reforms and compute how they a¤ect the intensive
(3) and extensive choices (4). The rst elementary tax reform captures the substitution e¤ect
around the actual tax schedule. The marginal tax rate T 0 (Y ) is decreased by an amount  over
the range of earnings [Yw   ; Yw + ]. So doing, the level of tax at earnings level Yw is kept
constant, and so is Cw. The reform is illustrated in the left part of Figure 1.
The behavioral response to such a reform for a worker of skill w is captured by the compen-
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sated elasticity of earnings with respect to 1  T 0 (Y ):14
"w
def 1  T
0 (Yw)
Yw
 @Y
@
=
U 0Y
Yw 

U 00Y Y   2
U 0Y
U 0c

U 00CY +
U 0Y
U 0c
2 U 00CC   T 00 (Yw)  U 0C > 0 (9)
When the marginal tax rate is decreased by  , a unit rise Yw in earnings generates a higher
gain Cw = (1  T 0 (Yw) + )Yw of consumption. Therefore, the workers substitute earnings
for lower leisure. Finally, this reform only has a second-order e¤ect on Uw, thereby on the
participation decisions.15
The next elementary tax reform captures the income e¤ect around the actual tax schedule.
The level of tax is decreased by a lump sum amount  over a range of earnings [Yw   ; Yw + ].
This reform is illustrated in the right part of Figure 1. Along the intensive margin, the behavioral
response for a worker of skill w to this reform is captured by the income e¤ect:
w
def @Y
@
=
U 0Y
U 0C

U 00CC   U 00CY
U 00Y Y   2
U 0Y
U 0c

U 00CY +
U 0Y
U 0c
2 U 00CC   T 00 (Yw)  U 0C (10)
This term can be either positive or negative. However, when leisure is a normal good, the
numerator is positive, hence the income e¤ect (10) is negative.
The "-reform" illustrated in the right part of Figure 1 also induces some individuals of skill
w to enter the labor market. We capture this extensive response for individuals of skill w by:
w
def 1
h (w)
 @h (w)
@
=
h0U (w)
h (w)
 U 0C (11)
which stands for the percentage of variation in the number of workers with a skill level w.
Finally, we measure the elasticity of participation when, together with a uniform decrease of
the tax level by , the welfare benet b rises by  (i.e. when T (Y ) + b is kept constant). This
reform captures income e¤ects along the extensive margin. The (endogenous) semi-elasticity of
the number of employed workers of skill w with respect to such a reform equals:
w
def h
0
U (w)
h (w)
 U 0C (Cw; Yw; w) +
h0b (w)
h (w)
= w +
h0b (w)
h (w)
(12)
The behavioral responses given in (7), (9), (10), (11) and (12) are endogenous. They depend
on skill level w, earnings level Y and the tax function T (:). In particular, the various responses
along the intensive margin given in (7), (9) and (10) are standard (see e.g. Saez (2001)), except
for the presence of T 00 (:) in their denominators. An exogenous increase in either w,  , or 
14The elasticity "w is called compensated since the tax level is kept unchanged at earnings level Yw.
15Decreasing T 0 (:) by  implies a rise Yw of earnings, which itself increases Cw by Cw =
(1  T 0 (Yw) + )Yw. Therefore the impact on Uw is given by Uw = U (Cw; Yw; w) =
[(1  T 0 (Yw) + )U 0C + U 0Y ]Yw = U 0C  ("wYw= (1  T 0 (Yw))) 2 where the second equality follows (5) and (9)
through Yw = ("wYw= (1  T 0 (Yw)))  .
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induces a direct change in earnings 1Yw. However, this change in turn modies the marginal
tax rate by 1T 0 = T 00 (Yw)  1Yw, inducing a second change in earnings 2Yw. Therefore,
a circular process takes place: The earnings level determines the marginal tax rate through
the tax function and the marginal tax rate a¤ects the earnings level through the substitution
e¤ect. The term T 00 (Yw)  U 0C captures the indirect e¤ects due to this circular process (in the
words of Saez (2001), see also Saez (2003) p. 483 and Appendix A). Unlike Saez (2001), we
do not dene the behavioral responses along an hypothetical linear tax function, but along the
actual (or later optimal) tax schedule, that we allow to be nonlinear. Therefore, our behavioral
responsesparameters (7), (9) and (10) take into account the circular process and exhibit a term
T 00 (:) in their denominator.
II.3 The Government
The governments budget constraint takes the form
b =
Z w1
w0
(T (Yw) + b)  h (w)  dw   E (13)
where E is an exogenous amount of public expenditures. For each additional worker of skill w,
the government collects taxes T (Yw) and saves the welfare benet b.
Turning now to the governments objective, we adopt a welfarist criterion that sums over
all types of individuals a transformation G (v; w; ) of individualsutility v, with G (:; :; :) twice-
continuously di¤erentiable and G0v > 0. Given the labor supply decisions, the governments
objective writes

 =
Z w1
w0
(Z Uw U(b;0;w)
 1
G (Uw   ;w; )  k (;w) d (14)
+
Z max
Uw U(b;0;w)
G (U (b; 0; ) ; w; )  k (;w) d
)
f (w) dw
Redistribution is ensured by assuming G00vv < 0 or G00vw < 0, the latter meaning that the objective
function compensates agents endowed with lower skills.
Let  denote the marginal social cost of the public funds E. For a given tax function T (:),we
denote gw (respectively g0) the (average and endogenous) marginal social weight associated to
employed workers of skill w (to the nonemployed), expressed in terms of public funds by:
gw
def E

G0v (Uw   ;w; )  U 0C (Cw; Yw; w)

jw;  Uw   U (b; 0; w)

(15)
g0
def E

G0v (U (b; 0; w) ; w; )  U 0C (b; 0; w)

j > Uw   U (b; 0; w)

(16)
The government values an additional dollar to the h (w) employed workers of skill w (to the
1 H (w1) nonemployed) as gw times h (w) dollars (g0 times 1 H (w1) dollars). The government
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wishes to transfer income from individuals whose social weight is below 1 to those for which
the social weight is above 1. As will be clear below, g0 and the shape of the marginal social
weights w 7! gw entirely summarize how the governments preferences inuence the optimal tax
policy. The only properties we have is that g0 and gw are positive. In particular, the shape of
w 7! gw can be non-monotonic, decreasing or increasing and we can have g0 above or below gw0 .
However, a government that has redistributive concerns would typically exhibits a decreasing
shape w 7! gw of social welfare weights, as it will be discussed in Section IV.
III Optimal marginal tax rates
III.1 Derivation of the optimal marginal tax formula
The governments problem consists in nding a nonlinear income tax schedule T (:) and welfare
benet b to maximize the social objective (14), subject to the budget constraint (13) and to the
labor supply decisions along both margins. In this section we directly derive the optimal tax
formula through a small perturbation of the optimal tax function. Following Mirrlees (1971),
Appendix B solves the governments problem in terms of incentive-compatible allocations, using
optimal control techniques and veries that both methods lead to the same optimal tax formulae:
Proposition 1 The optimal tax policy has to verify
T 0 (Yw)
1  T 0 (Yw) = A (w)  B (w)  C (w) (17)
0 = C (w0) (18)
1  g0

1 
Z w1
w0
h (n)  dn

 
Z w1
w0
gn  h (n)  dn = (19)Z w1
w0

n  T 0 (Yn) + n  (T (Yn) + b)
	
h (n) dw
where
A (w) def w
"w
B (w) def H (w1) H (w)
w  h (w)
C (w) def
R w1
w f1  gn   n  T 0 (Yn)  n (T (Yn) + b)g  h (n)  dn
H (w1) H (w)
Equation (17) summarizes the trade-o¤behind the choice of the marginal tax rate at earnings
level Yw. We consider the e¤ects of the innitesimal perturbation of the tax function depicted
in the left part of Figure 2. Marginal tax rates are uniformly decreased by an amount  over a
range of earnings [Yw   ; Yw]. Therefore, the tax levels are uniformly decreased by an amount
 =    for all skill levels n above w. This tax reform has four e¤ects: a substitution e¤ect for
tax payers whose earnings before the reform are in [Yw   ; Yw], and some mechanical, income
and participation response e¤ects for tax payers with skill n above w.
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Figure 2: The optimal tax schedule
Substitution e¤ect The substitution e¤ect takes place on the range of gross earnings [Yw   ; Yw].
The mass of workers a¤ected by the substitution e¤ect is h^ (Yw) . For these workers, according
to Equation (9), the decrease by  of the marginal tax rate induces a rise Yw of their earnings,
with
Yw =
"w  Yw
1  T 0 (Yw)  
The tax reform has only second-order e¤ect on Uw, thereby on the participation decisions and
on their contribution to the government objective. However, the rise in their earnings increases
the governments tax receipt by T 0 (Yw)Yw. Hence, given that  = , the total substitution
e¤ect equals
Sw = T
0 (Yw)
1  T 0 (Yw)  "w  Yw  h^ (Yw)   (20)
Workers of skill n above w face a reduction  in their tax level without change in their
marginal tax rate. This has three consequences.
Mechanical e¤ects First, absent any behavioral response for these workers, the government
gets  units of tax receipts less from each of the h (n) workers of skill n. However, the tax
reduction induces a higher consumption level Cn, which is valued gn by the government. Hence
the total mechanical e¤ect at skill w is:
Mw =  
Z w1
w
(1  gn)  h (n)  dn   (21)
Income e¤ects Second, the tax reduction induces each of the workers of skill n to change
their intensive choice by Yn = n  (see Equation (10)). This income response has only a rst-
order e¤ect on the governments budget: each of the h (n) workers of skill n pays T 0 (Yn) Yn
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additional tax. Hence, the total income e¤ect at skill n equals:
Iw =
Z w1
w
n  T 0 (Yn)  h (n)  dn   (22)
Participation e¤ects Finally, the reduction in tax levels induces n  h (n)   individuals of
skill n to enter employment (see Equation (11)). The change in participation decisions has only
a rst-order e¤ect on the governments budget. Each additional worker of skill n pays T (n)
taxes and the government saves the welfare benet b. Hence, the total participation e¤ect at
skill w equals:
Pw =
Z w1
w
n  (T (Yn) + b)  h (n)  dn   (23)
The sum of Sw, Mw, Iw and Pw should be zero if the original tax function is optimal.
Rearranging terms then gives
T 0 (Yw)
1  T 0 (Yw) =
1
"w

R w1
w f1  gn   n  T 0 (Yn)  n (T (Yn) + b)g  h (n)  dn
Yw  h^ (Yw)
(24)
which gives (17) thanks to (8).
Equation (18) describes the e¤ects of giving a uniform transfer  to all employed workers.
This tax pertubation does not a¤ect marginal tax rates, so it only induces mechanical, income
and participation e¤ects. The sum of (21), (22) and (23) evaluated for w = w0 should be nil at
the optimum, which leads to (18). Equations (17) and (18) implie that optimal marginal tax
rate are nil at the minimum earnings level.16
To grasp the intuition behind Equation (19), consider a unit increase in welfare benet b
and a unit lump-sum decrease in the tax function for all skill levels. This reform does neither
change marginal nor participation tax rates. Hence, it has only mechanical and income e¤ects
along the intensive and extensive margins. This reform induces a (mechanical) loss of the tax
revenues valued 1 by the government and a gain in the social objective. The latter amounts
to g0 

1  R w1w0 h (n)  dn for nonemployed people and to R w1w0 gn  h (n)  dn for the employed
workers. Therefore, the mechanical e¤ect corresponds to the left-hand side of (19). The right-
hand side captures the income e¤ects along both margins.17 First, through the income response
along the intensive margin, earnings change by Yn = n. This a¤ects tax revenues by the
weighted integral of Yn T 0 (Yn) = n T 0 (Yn). Second, participation decisions change through
the income e¤ect by h (n) = n h (n). Since for each additional worker of skill n, tax revenues
16 Intuitively, increasing the marginal tax rate at a skill level w0 improves equity when the extra tax revenue
can be redistributed towards a positive mass of people with skills equal or lower to w0. Since the mass of agents
with skill w0 is nil, a positive marginal tax rate at w0 does not improve equity. It does however distort the labor
supply. The optimal marginal tax rate at the lowest skill level then equals zero (Seade (1977)).
17Diamond (1975), Sandmo (1998) and Jacobs (2009) emphasize that the social value of public funds should
only take into account behavioral responses due to income e¤ects. Equation (19) shows that only income e¤ects
along the intensive w and extensive w margins matter.
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increase by T (Yn)+b, the total impact is the weighted integral of n (T (Yn) + b). When leisure
is a normal good, one has n < 0 and n < 0. Therefore, since T (Yn)+ b is typically positive for
most workers, we expect that larger income e¤ects along both margins increase the aggregate
average of social welfare weights (g0 and gns) above 1.
III.2 Comparison with the optimal tax literature
Equation (17) decomposes the determinants of the optimal marginal tax rates into three com-
ponents. A (w) is the e¢ ciency term. B (w) captures the role of the skill distribution among
employed individuals. Finally, C (w) stands for the social preferences for income redistribution,
taking into account the induced responses through income e¤ects and along the participation
margin.
There are two apparent di¤erences between our formulation of the e¢ ciency term A (w)
and the literature. The rst is the presence of T 00 (Yw) in the denitions (7) and (9) of w and
"w. This is due to our denitions of behavioral responses along a potentially nonlinear income
tax schedule and the induced endogeneity of marginal tax rates. However, in the ratio w="w,
these additional terms cancel out. So, the term A (w) is the same whether we dene behavioral
elasticities w and "w along the optimal tax schedule (as we do in the present paper) or along a
virtuallinear tax schedule (as usually done in the literature, see e.g. Piketty 1997, Diamond
1998 and Saez 2001). The second di¤erence is induced by our assumption on preferences (1).
The literature is typically restricted to the case where preferences over consumption and work
e¤ort do not vary with skill levels, and are described by U (C; Y=w). Then, it happens that the
numerator of A (w) coincides with one plus the uncompensated elasticity of the labor supply.
This is counterintuitive, since it suggests that ceteris paribus marginal tax rates increases with
the latter elasticity. Our more general assumption on preferences enables us to stress that in
fact, what matters is the elasticity w of earnings with respect to skill levels. Marginal tax rates
are then inversely related to the compensated elasticity in the vein of the inversed elasticity
rule of Ramsey.
The term B (w) captures the role of the skill distribution. Consider an increase of the marginal
tax rate around the earnings level Yw (the left part of Figure 2). The induced distortions along
the intensive margin are larger, the higher is the skill w times the number of workers at that skill
level, w h(w) (Atkinson 1990). However, the gain in tax revenues is proportional to the number
H (w1) H (w) of employed workers of skill n above w. Two di¤erences with the literature are
worth noting. First, because of the extensive margin responses, what matters is the distribution
of skills among employed workers, and not within the entire population. Since h (w) =f (w)
equals the employment rate of workers of skill w and (H (w1) H (w)) = (1  F (w)) equals the
aggregate employment rate above skill w, one can further decompose B (w) into its exogenous
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and endogenous components through:
B (w) = 1  F (w)
w  f (w) 
H(w1) H(w)
1 F (w)
h(w)
f(w)
The rst term on the right-hand side equals the exogenous skill distribution term of Diamond
(1998).18 Second, the distribution term in (Saez 2001, Equation (19)) concerns the (virtual)
distribution of earnings and not the skill distribution. This was the way for him to get rid of
the counterintuitive presence of the uncompensated labor supply elasticity in the numerator of
his e¢ ciency term. Using (7), one then gets that wB (w) =

H^ (Yw1)  H^ (Yw)

=Yw h^ (Yw), so
our optimal tax formula can also be expressed in terms of the earnings distribution, as we did
in (24). Both formulations have their advantage. On the one hand, the earnings distribution
has the advantage to be directly observable. On the other hand, it is easier to index individuals
by their exogenous skill rather than their endogenous earnings. We therefore choose to present
the two formulations, letting the reader choosing which of the two she/he prefers.
The term C (w) captures the inuence of social preferences for income redistribution, taking
into account the induced responses through income e¤ects and along the participation margin.
It equals the average of mechanical, income and participation e¤ects for all workers of skill n
above w. Diamond (1998) considers the case where participation is exogenous and there is no
income e¤ect.19 Introducing income e¤ects or participation responses in the analysis amounts
to modifying the social weight to
gn
def gn + n  (T (Yn) + b) + n  T 0 (Yn)
Saez (2002, p. 1055) has explained why the government is more willing to transfer income
to groups of employed workers for which the participation response n or the participation tax
T (Yn)+b is larger. The behavioral parameter n is positive, so a decrease in the level of tax paid
by workers of skill n induces more of them to work. Whenever the participation tax T (Yn) + b
is positive, tax revenues increase, which is benecial. We argue that a similar interpretation
can be made for the income e¤ect. Typically, leisure is a normal good (hence n < 0). Then,
a decrease in the level of tax paid by workers of skill n induces them to work less through the
income e¤ect. Whenever they face a positive marginal tax rate, this response decreases the tax
they pay, which is detrimental to the government. Therefore, the government is more willing to
transfer income to groups of employed workers for which income e¤ects are lower (i.e. higher
n) and marginal tax rates are lower (Saez 2001).
18Diamond (1998)s C (w) corresponds to our B (w) and vice-versa.
19Under redistributive preferences, marginal social weights gw are decreasing in skill levels w. Then, C (w) is
increasing, but remains below 1. When in addition preferences are maximin (see Atkinson 1975, Piketty 1997,
Salanié 2005, Boadway and Jacquet 2008 among others), then the marginal social weights for workers gw are nil,
so C (w) is constant and equals 1.
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IV Properties of the second-best optimum
IV.1 Su¢ cient condition for nonnegative marginal tax rates
We rst consider the special case where labor supply decisions take place only along the extensive
margin, as assumed in Diamond (1980) and Choné and Laroque (2005, 2009a), so "w = w = 0.
The optimal tax formula then veries:20
T (Yw) =
1  gw
w
  b (25)
The optimal level of taxes then trades o¤ the mechanical e¤ect (captured by the social weight
gw) and the participation response e¤ect (captured by the participation response w) of a rise
in the level of tax. Marginal tax rates are then everywhere nonnegative if along the optimal
allocation, the function Y 7! (1  gw) =w is increasing. The following Proposition shows that
this result remains valid in the presence of responses along the intensive margin.
Proposition 2 If along the optimal allocation, w 7! 1 gww is increasing, marginal tax rates
are always nonnegative. Furthermore, they are almost everywhere positive, except at the two
extremities Yw0 and Yw1.
This Proposition is proved in Appendix C. The intuition is illustrated in the right part of
Figure 2. This gure depicts the level of tax T (Yw) paid by a worker of skill w, as a function of
her skill level. When labor supply responses are only along the extensive margin, the optimal
tax schedule is represented by the dashed curve. It corresponds to the optimal trade-o¤ between
mechanical and participation e¤ects. Under the Assumption w 7! (1  gw) =w is increasing
in w, this function is increasing in the skill level. However, when the worker can also decide
along her intensive margin, such an increasing tax function and its positive marginal tax rates
induce distortions of the intensive choices. Hence, the optimal tax function, which is depicted
by the solid curve, is atter than the optimal curve without intensive margin to limit the
distortions along the intensive margin. It also has to be as close as possible to the optimal curve
without intensive margin to limit departures from the optimal trade-o¤ between participation
and mechanical e¤ects.
Proposition 3 If along the optimal allocation, w 7! 1 gww is increasing in w and if gw  1 for
all skill levels, then in work benets (if any) are smaller than the welfare benet b.
The assumption that gw  1 for all skills is restrictive. It implies that the optimal tax in the
case without intensive responses is characterized by leaving to the least skilled workers lower
20 In the absence of response along the intensive margin, substitution e¤ects Sw in (20) and income e¤ects Iw
in (22) are nil at each skill level. Therefore, the sum of mechanicalMw and participation Pw e¤ects have to be
nil at each skill level, which gives (25).
16
benet than to the nonemployed (hence a Negative Income Tax is optimal). This result remains
valid in the presence of intensive responses since the optimal tax function under unobserved
skills is atter than the one under observed skills. Proposition 3 emphasizes this result.
In the absence of behavioral responses along the intensive margin, in-work benets for the
working poor (of skill w0) are larger than welfare benets if and only if gw0 > 1. By continuity,
as long as the compensated elasticity (along the intensive margin) "w0 is small enough, in-work
benets should remain higher than welfare benets hence an EITC is optimal. This has already
been emphasized by Saez (2002).
IV.2 Examples
The su¢ cient condition in Propositions 2 and 3 depends on the patterns of social weights gw
and extensive behavioral response w which are endogenous. This subsection provides examples
of specications of the primitives where the su¢ cient conditions in Propositions 2 and 3 are
satised.
Our rst example species the primitives of the model in such a way that gw and w become
exogenous. For this purpose, individualspreferences are quasilinear: U (C; Y;w) = C V (Y;w)
with V 0Y ;V 00Y Y > 0 > V 00Y w. The marginal utility of consumption U 0C (C; Y;w) is then always equal
to one. Second, we specify the distribution of disutility of participation  conditional on skill
level w to be K (;w) = exp (aw +   ), where aw is a skill-specic parameter adjusted to keep
some individuals out-of-the labor force at the optimum. Then w is always equal to parameter
 according to Equation (11) and is thereby constant along the skill distribution. Finally, the
social objective is linear in utilities with skill-specic weights w. Since the specication of
individualsutility rules out income e¤ects, we have that gw = w=
R w1
w0
wdw (see (15), (16) and
(19)). Therefore, under redistributive social preferences, w 7! w is decreasing, so (1  gw) =w
is decreasing. Marginal Tax rates are then nonnegative according to Proposition 2. Note that in
such case, one must have gw0 > 1, so this specication does not rule out a negative participation
tax to be optimal for working poor.
This rst example is however very specic. In general, we think it is very plausible that
w 7! 1   gw is non-increasing and w 7! w is strictly decreasing. First, a redistributive gov-
ernment typically gives a higher social welfare weight on the consumption of the least skilled
workers. Second, there is some empirical evidence that the elasticity of participation, which
equals (Yw   T (Yw)  b)w is typically a nonincreasing function (see e.g. Juhn et alii 1991,
Immervoll et alii 2007 or Meghir and Phillips 2008). Since consumption Yw   T (Yw) is an
increasing function, one can expect w to decrease along the skill distribution.
We now provide more general specications on primitives where these two properties hold.
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Assume that the utility function is additively-separable, i.e.
U (C; Y;w) = u (C)  V (Y;w) (26)
with u0C ;V 0Y ;V 00Y Y > 0 > u00CC ;V 00Y w. The additive separability restriction is only made for
technical convenience. However showing within the pure intensive model that marginal tax
rates are positive without imposing the additive separability assumption (26) was a real issue
(see e.g. Sadka 1976, Seade 1982, Werning 2000). We add another restriction on preferences.
For an employed worker, a given earnings level is obtained thanks to lower e¤ort, the more
skilled the worker is. However, for a nonemployed, no e¤ort is supplied hence a larger skill does
not improve utility. Hence we assume:
V 0w (Y;w)
<
=
0 if Y
>
=
0 (27)
So, the skill-specic threshold Uw   U (b; 0; w) of  is constrained to be an increasing function
of the skill level. The following properties are shown in Appendix E.
Property 1 If K (;w) is strictly log-concave wrt to , w 7! k (;w) =K (;w) is non-increasing
in w and (26)-(27) hold, then w 7! w is strictly decreasing.
The logconcavity of K (:; w) is property veried by most distributions commonly used. It
is equivalent to assuming that k (;w) =K (;w) is decreasing in . That k (;w) =K (;w) is
non-increasing in w encompasses the specic case where w and  are independently distributed.
Property 2 If either Maximin social preferences or Benthamite social preferences and (26)-
(27), then w 7! gw is non-increasing
Maximin (i.e. maximizing u (b)) and Benthamite (i.e. G (Uw   ;w; ) = Uw ) social pref-
erences are polar specications. Combining Properties 1 and 2, the relation w 7! (1  gw) =w
is increasing provided that gw remains below 1. Therefore, Propositions 2 and 3 hold under the
Maximin, utility functions verifying (26) and (27), K (;w) strictly log-concave wrt to  and
k (;w) =K (;w) nonincreasing in w. Moreover, if the government is instead Benthamite and
if gw0  1, then Propositions 2 and 3 are again ensured.
V Numerical simulations for the U.S.
This section implements our optimal tax formula with real data to analyze if and to what
extent optimal schedules resemble real-world schedules and if not, how to reform them. This
exercise also allows checking whether our su¢ cient condition for non-negative marginal tax rates
is empirically reasonable.
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V.1 Calibration
To calibrate the model we need to specify social and individual preferences and the distribution
of characteristics (w;). We consider Benthamite and Maximin social preferences. We choose a
specication of individual preferences that enables us to control behavioral responses along the
intensive margin. Following Diamond (1998), we assume away income e¤ects along the intensive
margin (hence w  0) and assume the compensated elasticities to be constantly equal to "
along a linear tax schedule. Moreover, individualspreferences are concave so that a Benthamite
government has a preference to transfer income from high to low income earners. Hence, we
specify
U (C; Y;w) =

C    Yw 1+ 1" + 11 
1  
The parameter " corresponds to the compensated elasticity along a linear tax schedule (see
Equation (9)) while parameter  drives the redistributive preferences of a Benthamite govern-
ment. Saez et al. (2009) surveys the recent literature that estimates the elasticity of earnings to
marginal tax rates. They conclude that The most reliable longer-run estimates range from 0:12
to 0:4 in the U.S. We take a central value of " = 0:25 for our benchmark. For the concavity
of preferences, we take  = 0:8 in the benchmark case. We conduct sensitivity analysis with
respect to these two parameters.
To calibrate the skill distribution, we take the earnings distribution from the Current Popu-
lation Survey for May 2007. We use the rst-order condition (5) of the intensive program to infer
the skill level from each observation of earnings. We consider only single individuals to avoid the
complexity of interrelated labor supply decisions within families. Using OECD tax database,
the real tax schedule of singles without dependent children is well approximated by a linear tax
function at rate 27:9% and an intercept at $  4024:9 on an annual basis.21 We use a quadratic
kernel with a bandwidth of $3822 to smooth h(w). High-income earners are underrepresented
in the CPS. Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) argue that the skill distribution actually exhibits
a fat upper-tail in the US, which has dramatic consequence for the shape of optimal marginal
tax rates. We therefore expand (in a continuously di¤erentiable way) our kernel estimation by
taking a Pareto distribution, with an index22 a = 2 for skill levels between w = $20374 and
w1 = $40748.23 This represents only the top 3:1% of our approximation of the skill distribution.
One nally needs to calibrate the conditional distribution of . For numerical convenience,
we choose a logistic and skill-specic specication of the form
K (;w) =
exp ( aw + w )
1 + exp ( aw + w )
21We multiply by 52 the weakly earnings given by the CPS survey.
22An (untruncated) Pareto distribution with Pareto index a > 1 is such that Pr(w > bw) = C= bwa with a;C 2 R+0 .
23We have w0 = $202.
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Parameters aw and w are calibrated to obtain empirically plausible skill-specic employment
rates, denoted by Lw, and elasticities of employment rates with respect to the di¤erence in
disposable incomes Cw   b, denoted w. We take
Lw = 0:7 + 0:1

w   w0
w1   w0
1=3
w = 0   1

w   w0
w1   w0

with 0 = 0:5 and 1 = 0:1
These specications are consistent with the empirical fact that the employment rate Lw is larger
for high-skilled than for low-skilled. The average employment rate in the current economy equals
75:3%. The elasticity w is equal to 0:45 on average. Unreported simulations point out that
the properties of the optimal tax schedule are robust to changes in the parameters of the above
w ! Lw relationship. A sensitivity analysis will illustrate how the calibration of w modies the
optimal tax prole.
We take b = $2381 since the net replacement ratio for a long term unemployed worker whose
previous earnings equals 67% of average wage equals 9% in 2007 according to OECD. Given this
calibration of the current economy, we nd that the buget constraint (13) is veried only when
we set the exogenous revenue requirement to E = $6110 per capita.
V.2 Benchmark simulations
Figure 3 plots the optimal marginal tax rates (Panel (a)) and participation tax levels (Panel (b))
as functions of earnings, under the Benthamite (solid line) and Maximin (dotted line) criteria.
We focus on earnings below $100; 000.24 Consistent with Proposition 2, marginal tax rates are
always positive, under both criteria. Moreover, there is no distortion at the very bottom of the
earnings distribution whose value is Yw0 = $508. This contrasts with the positive marginal tax
rate obtained under Maximin, in a model with intensive margin only. In this case, everyone in
the objective function is at Y = Yw0 , so the equity e¤ect is positive and therefore, T
0  Yw0 > 0
at the Maximin optimum (Boadway and Jacquet 2008). When both extensive and intensive
margins are modeled, there is only a positive mass of welfare weight on the nonemployed,
under Maximin. Then, a positive marginal tax rate on the least-skilled workers would create a
distortion without bringing any equity gain hence T 0
 
Yw0

= 0. Panel (a) illustrates that this
result of no distortion is very local: When Y = $2; 150, the marginal tax rate climbs to 60:5%
(58:8%) under Benthamite (Maximin) preferences. Beyond, marginal tax rates follow the usual
U-shaped prole (Salanié 2003), under both objective functions. Under Maximin, marginal tax
rates are higher than under Bentham, except at the bottom end (for Y lower than Y = 5; 900$).
Remarkably, optimal marginal tax rates are signicantly higher than the current 27:9%, except
for the very low end of the earnings distribution. This is valid under both objectives.
24 Income earners above $100; 000 correspond to 4:65%, 3:73% and 5:66% of the population at the current
economy, the Benthamite optimum and the Maximin optimum, respectively.
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Figure 3(b) illustrates that participation tax levels at the bottom of the earnings distribution
are typically negative under a Benthamite criterion. The optimality of a negative participation
tax on the poorest workers is usually interpreted as a case for an Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) (Saez 2002). We nd b = $2; 665 and T (Yw0) = $9; 345. Contrastingly, Figure 3(b) also
emphasizes that participation tax levels at the bottom of the earnings distribution are positive,
under Maximin. A Negative Income Tax (NIT) then prevails. This is a standard result of the
pure extensive margin model (Choné Laroque 2005) which is still valid here when considering
both extensive and intensive margins together.25 Intuitively, it is hardly desirable to transfer
income to the least skilled workers, since their well-being does not matter under Maximin. At
the Maximin optimum, we nd b = $4; 190 and  T (Yw0) = $3; 860.
Figure 3: The simulation under the benchmark calibration
Figure 4(a) describes how the negative participation tax on least skilled workers enables to
boost employment rates well above their values in the current economy. Moreover, Panel (b)
illustrates how these negative participation tax rates (in the Bentham economy) increase the
utility levels of low-skilled workers signicantly beyond their values in the current economy.
V.3 Sensitivity analysis
All our various sensitivity analysis exercises point out that the U-shape prole is valid and
none of them displays negative marginal tax rates. The only conguration where our su¢ cient
condition for nonnegative marginal tax rate is violated requires an extremely low . And, even
then, the marginal tax rates are still positive. This section therefore focuses on the quantitative
implications of parameters on the optimal tax rates.
As illustrated in Figure 5(a), the levels of marginal tax rates are quite sensitive to the
25Saez (2002) suggests this result in his mixed model.
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Figure 4: Optimal allocations
Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis with respect to 
parameter  of the individual preferences. Any rise of  increases the marginal tax prole by a
substantial amount since the planner becomes more averse to inequality. The participation tax
levels increase (decrease) with  below (above) Y around $20; 000. Higher redistributive tastes
increase the transfers towards the low-paid workers and the other workers pay more taxes (see
Panel (b)).
Figure 6(a) illustrates that marginal tax rates decrease with the elasticity of earnings ",
as theoretically expected from the implied decrease of A (w) in Equation (17). Figure 6(a)
illustrates this result with " equals to 0:25 and 0:5, under Maximin and Benthamite preferences.26
Figure 6(b) emphasizes that participation taxes decrease (increase) with " for earnings above
(below) roughly around $30; 000, under both criteria.
26Under Maximin, the marginal tax rates decrease with " except for earnings below $5; 249.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis with respect to "
Figure 7: A lower w 7! w in the calibration of the current economy
The next exercise studies the impact of reducing the participation response w. Figure 7
plots the tax schedule when the parameter 0 shrinks from 0:5 to 0:1. This reduction of the
elasticities of employment rates w 7! w (hence the reduction of w) signicantly increases the
marginal tax rates (see Panel (a)), as expected from the implied decrease of C (w) in Equation
(17). Moreover, as also expected from theory, the participation tax levels increase (Panel (b)).
This exercise highlights the quantitative implications of introducing the extensive margin.
Another sensitivity exercise considers a more decreasing w 7! w in the current economy
hence a more decreasing w 7! w. Figure 8 plots the tax rates when (0; 1)  (0:75; 0:25)
(solid curves) instead of (0; 1)  (0:5; 0:1) (dashed curves). As expected from the C (w) term
in Equation (17), the marginal tax rates then increase. Also, the participation tax curves become
more increasing, under both criteria (Pannel (b)), as expected from theory.
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Figure 8: A more decreasing w 7! w in the current economy
Our calibration abstracts from income e¤ects. For consistency with the theoretical frame-
work, we also focus on single households and then abstract from the interactions between labor
supply decisions within couples. However, those dimensions are not necessary to show how
crucial it is to consider both labor supply margins to give tax policy recommendations.
VI Conclusion
This paper explored the optimal income tax schedule when labor supply is simultaneously along
both the extensive and the intensive margins. Individuals are heterogeneous in two dimensions:
their skills and their disutility of participation. We derived a fairly mild su¢ cient condition
for nonnegative marginal tax rates over the entire skill distribution. This condition is derived
thanks to a new method to sign distortions (along the intensive margin) in screening models
with random participation. Our exercise illustrated that negative participation tax rates can
optimally coexist with positive marginal tax rates everywhere.
Using U.S. data, we implemented our optimal tax formula. This exercise emphasized that
the U-shaped optimal tax schedule found in the model with intensive margin only is still valid
when both labor supply margins are considered. But introducing the extensive margin quite
substantially reduces the marginal tax rates. Interestingly, the marginal tax rates are always
positive in our simulations.
This paper also points to extensions. The method to sign distortion along the intensive
margin can been applied to other contexts of nonlinear pricing theory where agents are charac-
terized by a multi-dimensional parameter that is unobserved by the principal. It would also be
interesting to extend the numerical simulations to data sets from other countries.
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Appendices
A Behavioral Elasticities
We dene
Y (Y;w;  ; ) def  1  T 0 (Y ) +   U 0C (Y   T (Y ) +  (Y   Yw) + ; Y; w)
+U 0Y (Y   T (Y ) +  (Y   Yw) + ; Y; w)
The rst-order condition (5) is equivalent to Y (Yw; w; 0; 0) = 0. When T (:) is twice-di¤erentiable,
one has (using (5)):
Y 0Y (Yw; w; 0; 0) = U 00Y Y   2
U 0Y
U 0c

U 00CY +
U 0Y
U 0c
2
U 00CC   T 00 (Yw)  U 0C (28a)
Y 0w (Yw; w; 0; 0) =
 
1  T 0  U 00Cw + U 00Y w = U 00Y w  U 0C   U 00Cw  U 0YU 0C (28b)
Y 0 (Yw; w; 0; 0) = U 0C (28c)
Y 0 (Yw; w; 0; 0) =
 
1  T 0  U 00CC + U 00CY = U 00CY  U 0C   U 00CC  U 0YU 0C (28d)
The second-order condition writes Y 0Y (Yw; w; 0; 0)  0, which gives (6). When this condition
holds with strict inequality, and when the global maximum in Y of U (Y   T (Y ) ; Y; w) is unique,
we can apply the implicit function theorem to Y (Yw; w; 0; 0). Provided that the sizes of the
changes in w,  and  are small enough for the maximum of Y 7! U (Y   T (Y ) ; Y; w) to change
only marginally, one has for x = w;  ; , that @Y=@x =  Y 0x=Y 0Y evaluated at (Yw; w; 0; 0). This
leads directly to (7), (9) and (10).
We now make the link between our denitions of behavioral elasticities and the elasticities
along a linear tax schedule used in Saez (2001). We denote the latter with a tilde. Using the
derivatives above with T 00 (:) = 0, one gets:
~"w =
U 0Y
Yw

U 00Y Y   2
U 0Y
U 0C

U 00CY +
U 0Y
U 0C
2 U 00CC ~w =
U 0Y
U 0C

U 00CC   U 00CY
U 00Y Y   2
U 0Y
U 0c

U 00CY +
U 0Y
U 0c
2 U 00CC (29)
Consider now a uniform decrease  of marginal tax rates (rise  of the level of tax. Such a
reform has a rst impact on earnings 1Yw that equals
1Yw = ~"w  Yw
1  T 0 (Yw)   or 1Yw = ~w  
which in turn implies a change in marginal tax rates of  T 00 (Yw)  1Yw. Hence, the reform
has a second impact on earnings that equals
2Yw =  ~"w  Yw
1  T 0 (Yw)  T
00 (Yw)1Yw
This circular process takes place innitely, with the nth impact on earnings being linked to
the (n  1)th impact through
nYw =  ~"w  Yw
1  T 0 (Yw)  T
00 (Yw)n 1Yw
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The total impact equals
X+1
i=0
iYw = 1Yw=

1 + ~"w  Yw1 T 0(Yw)  T 00 (Yw)

. Hence "w, w,
~"w and ~w are linked through
"w
~"w
=
w
~w
=
1  T 0 (Yw)
Yw
X+1
i=0
iYw
1Yw
=
1
1 + ~"w  Yw1 T 0(Yw)  T 00 (Yw)
Using (5) and (29), one retrieves (9) and (10).
B Governments optimum
This appendix solves the governments problem in terms of allocations, like in Mirrlees (1971)
and studies what happens at bunching points. Using the obtained governments optimality
conditions, we show the equivalence between this formulation and the optimal tax formula of
Proposition 1.
According to the taxation principle (Hammond 1979, Rochet 1985 and Guesnerie 1995), the
set of allocations induced by the tax function T (:) corresponds to the set of incentive-compatible
allocations fYw; Cw; Uwgw2[w0;w1] that verify:
8 (w; x) 2 [w0; w1]2 Uw  U (Cw; Yw; w)  U (Cx; Yx; w) (30)
The incentive-compatible restrictions (30) impose that, when taking their intensive decisions,
workers of skill w prefer the bundle (Cw; Yw) designed for them rather then the bundle (Cx; Yx)
designed for workers of any other skill level x. We assume that w 7! Yw is continuous on [w0; w1]
and di¤erentiable everywhere, except for a nite number of skill levels. Finally, w 7! Uw is
di¤erentiable. Hence, w 7! Cw is also continuous everywhere and di¤erentiable almost every-
where. These assumptions are made for tractability reasons and are standard since Guesnerie
and La¤ont (1984).27
From Equation (2), the strict single-crossing condition holds. Hence, constraints (30) are
equivalent to imposing the di¤erential equation:
_Uw
a.e.
= U 0w (Cw; Yw; w) (31)
(31) and the monotonicity requirement that the earnings level Yw is a nondecreasing function of
the skill level w. We get:
Lemma 1 The necessary conditions for the governments problem are,28
 if there is no bunching at skill w :
1 +
U 0Y
U 0C

 h (w) = Zw  U
00
Y wU 0C   U 00CwU 0Y
U 0C
(32)
 if there is bunching over [w;w] :Z w
w

1 +
U 0Y
U 0C

 h (w)  dw =
Z w
w
Zw  U
00
Y wU 0C   U 00CwU 0Y
U 0C
 dw (33)
27Hellwig (2008) explain how the same rst-order conditions can be obtained under weaker assumptions on
w 7! Yw and w 7! Uw.
28where the various derivatives of U are evaluated at (Cw; Yw; w).
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For all skill levels
  _Zw = (1  gw)  h (w) + Zw  U
00
Cw
U 0C
  (T (Yw) + b)  h0U (w) (34)
with Zw1 = Zw0 = 0 and
1 
Z w1
w0
h (w)  dw

(1  g0) =
Z w1
w0
(Yw   Cw + b)  h0b (w)  dw (35)
Proof. Since U (:; :; :) is increasing in C, we dene Cw as function   (UwYw; w) so that:
u = U (C; Y;w) , C =   (u; Y; w)
We get
 0u =
1
U 0C
 0Y =  
U 0Y
U 0C
 0w =  
U 0w
U 0C
(36)
where the functions are evaluated at (w;C =   (u; Y; w) ; u = U (C; Y;w) ; Y ), Next, we rewrite
(31) as _Uw = 	(Uw; Yw; w), where
	(u; Y; w)
def U 0w (  (u; Y; w) ; Y; w)
One has from (36)
	0Y =
U 00Y wU 0C   U 00CwU 0Y
U 0C
	0U =
U 00Cw
U 0C
(37)
where the functions are evaluated at (w;Cw; Uw; Yw). We consider Yw as the control variable
and Uw as the state variable. Then  equals the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget
constraint (13). Let qw be the costate variable associated to (31) and let Zw =  qw=. The
Hamiltonian writes:
H (Y; U; q; w; ) def
Z Uw U(b;0;w)
0
G (V (Uw; w; ) ; w; )  k (;w)  d  f (w)  dw
+
Z +1
Uw U(b;0;w)
G
 U0 (b; w; ) ; w;   k (;w)  d  f (w)  dw     b
+ [Yw     (Uw; Yw; w) + b]  h (w) + qw 	(Uw; Yw; w)
The rst-order conditions of the governments program are
 If there is no bunching at skill w, one must have
0 =
@H
@Y
(Yw; Uw; qw; w; ) = 

1   0Y
  h+ qw 	0Y
Using Zw =  qw=, (36) and (37) leads to (32).
 If there is bunching over [w;w], one must have R ww @H=@Y (Yw; Uw; qw; w; )dw = 0. Using
again Zw =  qw= (36) and (37) gives (33).
 The transversality conditions are qw0 = qw1 = 0 and one gets for any skill level where
w 7! Yw is continuous,   _qw = @H=@U (Yw; Uw; qw; w; ). Using Zw =  qw= and (15) give
(34).
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 Finally, the rst-order condition with respect to b gives (35).
We now show how to retrieve the formula in Proposition 1. Let
Xw = Zw  exp
Z w
w0
	0U (Ux; Yx; x)  dx

and Jw = Zw  U 0C (Cw; Yw; w)
Zw and Jw have the same sign as Xw. As w 7! Zw, w 7! Xw is moreover di¤erentiable with a
derivative:
_Xw =
h
_Zw + Zw 	0U (Uw; Yw; w)
i
 exp
Z w
w0
	0U (Ux; Yx; x)  dx

Therefore, from (11), (34) and (37):
  _Xw = f1  gw   w  (T (Yw) + b)g  h (w)U 0C (Cw; Yw; w)
 exp
Z w
w0
	0U (Ux; Yx; x)  dx

(38)
At skill levels for which there is no bunching, Equation (32) can be rewritten using (5), (28b)
and (28c) as
T 0 (Yw)  h (w) = Zw  Y 0w = Jw 
Y 0w
Y 0
Using (7), (9) (28b) and (28c) we get
T 0 (Yw)
1  T 0 (Yw)  h (w) = Jw 
w
"w  w (39)
From (34) and (11) we get
_Jw =  f1  gw   w  (T (Yw) + b)g  h (w)  Zw  U 00Cw (Cw; Yw; w)
+Zw
n
U 00CC (Cw; Yw; w) _Cw + U 00CY (Cw; Yw; w)  _Yw + U 00Cw (Cw; Yw; w)
o
Assume now that the tax function is everywhere di¤erentiable and there is no bunching. Di¤er-
entiating Cw = Yw   T (Yw) and using (5) gives:
_Jw =  f1  gw   w  (T (Yw) + b)g  h (w)
+Zw

U 00CY (Cw; Yw; w)  U 00CC (Cw; Yw; w)
U 0Y (Cw; Yw; w)
U 0C (Cw; Yw; w)

 _Yw
Using (28c), (28d) and again (5):
_Jw =  f1  gw   w  (T (Yw) + b)g  h^ (w) + Jw 
Y 0
Y 0
 _Yw
With (7), (9), (10), (28c) and (28d) :
_Jw =  f1  gw   w  (T (Yw) + b)g  h (w) + Jw  w  w
"w  w
 
1  T 0 (Yw)

Finally, using (39)
_Jw =  f1  gw   w  (T (Yw) + b)g  h (w) + w  T 0 (Yw)  h (w)
Since Zw1 = 0, Jw1 = 0, so Jw =
R w1
w

  _Jn

dn. Using the last Equation and (39) gives (17).
Equation (18) is obtained from the transversality condition Jw1 = 0. Equation (19) comes by
adding (35) to (18).
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C Proof of Proposition 2
We turn back to the case where w 7! (Cw; Yw) is continuous everywhere and di¤erentiable
everywhere except on a nite number of skill levels (so that bunching can occur on a nite
number of skill interval). Note that continutity of w 7! Yw implies that w 7! Uw is continuously
di¤erentiable. We rst show
Lemma 2 Xw (thereby Zw) is everywhere nonnegative and almost everywhere positive within
(w0; w1) whenever w 7! 1 gww is increasing.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that Zw0  0 for some w0 2 (w0; w1). Then Xw0  0. By
continuity of w 7! Xw, and the transversality condition there exists a maximal interval [w2; w3]
where Xw  0 for all w 2 [w2; w3] and Xw2 = Xw3 . Moreover, since w 7! Cw is also contin-
uous everywhere and di¤erentiable almost everywhere, Xw is everywhere di¤erentiable with a
derivative given by (38).
 Since Xw2 = 0 and Xw  0 in the right neighborhood of w2, one must have _Xw2  0.
Hence, from (38)
1  gw2
w2
 T (Yw2) + b (40)
 Since Xw3 = 0 and Xw  0 in the left neighborhood of w3, one must have _Xw3  0. By a
symmetric reasoning, this leads to
T (Yw3) + b 
1  gw3
w3
(41)
 One has
T (w) + b = Yw     (Uw; Yw; w)
Function w 7! Yw     (Uw; Yw; w) is continuous and, except at a nite number of points,
is di¤erentiable with derivative
d (Yw     (Uw; Yw; w))
dw
= _Yw
 
1   0Y (Uw; Yw; w)
   0U (Uw; Yw; w)  _Uw    0w (Uw; Yw; w)
= _Yw

1 +
U 0Y (Uw; Yw; w)
U 0C (Uw; Yw; w)

  U
0
w (Cw; Yw; w)
U 0C (Cw; Yw; w)
+
U 0w (Cw; Yw; w)
U 0C (Cw; Yw; w)
= _Yw

1 +
U 0Y (Uw; Yw; w)
U 0C (Uw; Yw; w)

where the second equality follows (36). If there is bunching at w then _Yw = 0. If there
is no bunching at w, Equation (32) applies. Condition (2) and Zw  0 then induces that
w 7! Yw     (Uw; Yw; w) admits a nonpositive derivative. Hence, w 7! Yw     (Uw; Yw; w)
is weakly decreasing over [w2; w3], so
T (Yw2) + b  T (Yw3) + b (42)
Inequalities (40), (41) and (42) imply:
1  gw2
w2
 1  gw3
w3
This is consistent with the assumption that w 7! (1  gw) =w is increasing if and only if w2 = w3.
Therefore w0 = w2 = w3 and Xw0  0 for all skill levels and Xw = 0 only pointwise.
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Since Xw (hence Zw) is nonnegative everywhere and can be nil only pointwise, then, for skill
levels where there is no bunching, according to (5) and (32) marginal tax rate is nonnegative and
can be nil only pointwise. Bunch of skills correspond to a mass point of the earnings distribution
and to an upward discontinuity of marginal tax rates. However, the discontinuity is between
two marginal tax rates that correspond to skill levels without bunching for which we have shown
that marginal tax rates are nonnegative.
D Proof of Proposition 3
Since Xw0 = 0 and for all w, Xw  0 (from 2) then _Xw0  0. According to (38), this induces
1  gw0
w0
 T (Y0) + b
Since gw0  1, the left-hand side is positive, inducing that in work benet (i.e.  T (Y0) when
T (Y0) < 0) is lower than welfare benet b.
E Proofs of Properties 1 and 2
Under (27), Uw is increasing in skill w. Then, a Maximin government values only the welfare of
nonemployed and gw = 0 for all skill levels, which ensures property 2 for a Maximin government.
Under (26), U 0C depends only on the consumption level. From (2), incentive compatible condi-
tions (30) implies that w 7! Cw is nondecreasing. Therefore, since u00CC < 0, w 7! U 0C (Cw; Yw; w)
is nondecreasing, and is increasing without bunching.
Under (26) and a Benthamite government, gw simply equals U 0C (Cw; Yw; w) = according to
(15), which ensures property 2 for a Benthamite government.
Under Assumption (27), one has that the threshold value Uw   U (b; 0; w) of  below which
individuals of type (w;) choose to work, is decreasing in skill level w. So, when K (;w)
is strictly log-concave wrt  and w 7! k (;w) =K (;w) is non-increasing in w then w 7!
k (Uw   U (b; 0; w) ; w) =K (Uw   U (b; 0; w) ; w) is decreasing. Together with w 7! U 0C (Cw; Yw; w)
being nondecreasing, using (11), insures that w 7! w is decreasing, even in the presence of
bunching. So Property 1 is ensured.
E.1 Example 1
A Maximin government values only the welfare of nonemployed so gw = 0 for all skill levels
and (1  gw) =w = 1=w. Since Property 1 holds, (1  gw) =w is therefore increasing in w and
Proposition 2 applies. Moreover, as gw = 0, Proposition 3 applies too.
E.2 Example 2
Combining Properties 1, 2 and gw  1 ensures that (1  gw) =w is increasing in w. So, Propo-
sition 2 applies, thereby Proposition 3 since it has been assumed that gw  1.
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